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The Absurd Proposition  
of Aboriginal Sovereignty
Andrew Schaap
In Australia in the 1990s, ‘reconciliation’ emerged as an organizing discourse 
for political debate and policy-making in relation to Aboriginal affairs and the 
unfinished business of decolonisation. Unlike in countries such as Chile and South 
Africa, however, reconciliation was not pursued in the wake of a new constitutional 
settlement. Rather, reconciliation was proposed as an alternative to a treaty (between 
indigenous people and the state), which had been pursued by Aboriginal activists 
(at least) since the 1970s. Conservative and Labour governments entertained 
the proposition of a treaty or ‘Makarrata’ in the 1980s. By the 1990s, however, 
the claim to Aboriginal sovereignty, which underwrote the demand to negotiate 
a treaty, was deemed unreasonable by both major political parties. During the 
debate about a treaty in 1988, John Howard (Australian prime minister, 1996–
2007) declared: ‘It is an absurd proposition that a nation should make a treaty with 
some if its own citizens. It also denies the fact that Aboriginal people have full 
citizenship rights now’ (Howard 1988, 6). In this chapter, I take Howard’s notion 
of an ‘absurd proposition’ seriously as a characterization of the ‘agonic relation of 
colonial governance vis-à-vis indigenous resistance’ in Australia (Tully 2000, 13). 
In particular, I unpack the sense in which the clam to Aboriginal sovereignty might 
be characterized as an absurd proposition in terms of Lyotard’s conception of the 
differend and Jacques Rancière’s conception of disagreement.
For both Lyotard and Ranciere, politics is agonistic since it involves the 
struggle to delimit the speech situation in which a political claim can be raised. 
Politics is struggle within and over the discursive conditions in which a claim 
appears as reasonable or absurd. Rather than presupposing a speech situation in 
which parties implicitly agree on the criteria of validity in terms of which each 
other’s claims might be redeemed, for both Lyotard and Rancière political conflict 
paradigmatically arises in the context of a speech situation originated by a wrong. 
As such, there is an absence of shared procedures in terms of which the conflict 
might be regulated. The agon concerns the possibility of making visible the wrong 
on which the speech situation is predicated.
However, there are important differences between the agonism of Lyotard and 
Rancière (see Jenkins in this volume). Lyotard characterizes political agonism in 
terms of the problematic of the differend between incommensurable genres of 
discourse. A case of the differend occurs when a conflict between two parties is 
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regulated by the idiom of one party while the wrong suffered by the other party 
cannot be signified in that idiom. A wrong consists not only in the fact that a party 
is harmed but that the injured party is divested of the means to make visible this 
injury as an injustice. For Rancière, in contrast, the condition of possibility for the 
agon is a situation of misunderstanding in which one party cannot understand the 
other because he does not recognise her as a speaking being. Lacking the power 
of speech (logos), the other is supposed to have only voice (phôné) in which pain 
and pleasure might be expressed but claims about justice cannot be articulated. 
Political agonism arises when those who are supposed to have only voice act as 
if they have speech. In doing so, they demonstrate (i.e. make visible and audible) 
what was previously unseen and unheard: both the wrong of the social order and 
their appearance as political subjects.
I will suggest that from a legal perspective, the appearance of the claim to 
Aboriginal sovereignty as an absurd proposition does indeed appear as a case of 
the differend. This was exemplified in the High Court’s response to an indigenous 
woman that it ‘will not hear’ her protest that if Aboriginal people cannot get justice 
in the highest court of the country then that court must be a party to the genocide. 
And yet, the establishment of an ‘Aboriginal embassy’ in front of Parliament 
House in Canberra in 1972 testifies to the ongoing possibility that the wrong of 
colonization might be redressed politically. 
‘It Started off as a Joke’ (Paul Coe)
In characterizing the idea of a treaty as an absurd proposition, Howard seems 
to suggest that it is both unreasonable and illogical, ‘plainly opposed to reason, 
and hence, ridiculous silly’ (OED). As an unreasonable proposal, the proposition 
of Aboriginal sovereignty would be an attempt to justify a particular claim by 
appealing to principles that are not shared by the co-members of society to whom 
the claim is addressed. In Rawls’s terms, in staking political claims within a plural 
society one can legitimately appeal only to reasons that all members of that society 
might reasonably accept. For Howard and most Australians, it is unreasonable 
for Aborigines to expect anything other than the same share of the benefits of 
social co-operation that all citizens are entitled to. While they have a valid claim 
to adequate health, welfare and preservation of their culture, it is unreasonable for 
Aborigines to expect differential treatment based on a claim to special status as the 
traditional owners of the land. Following from this presumption of co-citizenship, 
as an illogical assertion the proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty would be a 
conclusion based on contradictory reasoning. Howard’s characterization of the 
illogic of Aboriginal sovereignty would go something like this: Treaties are made 
between two sovereign peoples. But Aborigines are already Australian citizens 
and hence co-members of the one sovereign people of Australia. In seeking a 
treaty with the Australian state, therefore, Aborigines (absurdly) come to treat with 
themselves.
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Yet, we might also understand the absurd proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty 
in a further sense that was unintended by Howard. While we usually understand 
the word proposition to refer to an act of speech (assertion or proposal) there is 
also an older, less common sense of the word which means ‘the action of setting 
forth or presenting something to view or perception; presentation, exhibition, 
display’ (OED). As a ridiculous presentation, the absurd proposition of Aboriginal 
sovereignty would be a display of sovereignty that at the same time testifies to its 
lack. Such a proposition might be absurd either in seeming silly (a demonstration 
of what one does not have) or in being a form of ridicule.
Indeed, the establishment of an Aboriginal Embassy on the lawns of Parliament 
House by four men carrying a beach umbrella on 26 January 1972 might 
be understood to exemplify an absurd proposition in the sense of a ridiculous 
presentation. Although these four men risked appearing silly, they initiated the most 
symbolically powerful political demonstration in Australia’s history. In parodying 
the sovereignty of the Australian state, the tent embassy became a serious political 
threat to the government of the day, a ‘diplomatic coup’ according to a journalist 
for the New York Times (Trumbull 1972). Within the hegemonic discourse of 
the settler society, the proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty could only amount 
to an unreasonable proposal or illogical assertion (a case of the differend). As a 
ridiculous presentation, however, it has the potential to contest the political unity 
in terms of which social relations between settler and indigenous societies are 
represented (the staging of a disagreement) (cf. Feltham 2004).
It was an irony lost on Howard in 1988, when he described a treaty as an absurd 
proposition, that the founding of the Aboriginal tent embassy ‘started off as a joke’ 
(Paul Coe cited in Waterford 1992, 1). As one historian observes: ‘the encampment 
was an Aboriginal twist on the larrikin sense of humour which throws rough-hewn 
insolence in the direction of Australian authority. As Dr Roberta Sykes reflected, “it 
was only a wag’s act to put it up anyway, in the beginning”’ (Robinson 1994, 51). 
The tent embassy was initiated as a protest against the refusal of the conservative 
McMahon government to grant land rights to Aboriginal people. In the early 
1970s there was an increasing militancy on the part of a younger generation of 
Aboriginal activists who, taking inspiration from the Black Power movement in 
America, demanded land rights for indigenous people (see Foley 2001). This new 
militancy was apparent when Paul Coe addressed a predominantly white anti-
Vietnam protest in 1971, criticizing the demonstrators for being prepared to march 
for oppressed peoples all over the world, except those in Australia: ‘You raped 
our women, you stole our land, you massacred our ancestors, you destroyed our 
culture, and now – when we refused to die out as you expected – you want to kill 
us with your hypocrisy’ (Coe quoted in Goodall 1996, 267).
On 25 January, the day before Australia Day, Prime Minister McMahon made 
his first major policy statement on Aboriginal affairs. The statement followed a 
recent ruling by the Supreme Court in the Northern Territory (Milirrpum v Nabalco 
Pty Ltd 1971), which upheld the doctrine of terra nullius, finding that Aboriginal 
people had no claim to native title in Australian law. Agreeing with the spirit of the 
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judgment, McMahon (1972, 12–13) outlined an assimilatory policy, according to 
which Aborigines should be assisted ‘to hold effective and respected places within 
one Australian society’ with equal rights and responsibilities as non-indigenous 
Australians. ‘The concept of separate development’, he insisted, ‘is utterly alien 
to these objectives’. Far from acknowledging Aboriginal land rights, McMahon 
promised only to make available ‘general purpose leases’ to some Aboriginal 
groups on condition that they made ‘reasonable economic and social use of the 
land’. Companies were to be allowed to continue mining any Aboriginal land 
without consent of its occupiers since this was taken to be in the national interest.
To the Redfern-based Aboriginal activists, the timing of the prime minister’s 
statement (for Australia Day, which is mourned by indigenous people as Invasion 
Day) was ‘a very provocative move’, which demanded a quick response (Foley 
2001, 14). With the loan of a car and $70 from a local branch of the Communist 
Party, four young men (Michael Anderson, Bertie Williams, Billie Craigie and Gary 
Williams) left Sydney late that night, arriving in the early hours of the morning 
to plant a beach umbrella on the lawns in front of Parliament House. Erecting a 
sign saying ‘Aboriginal Embassy’, they declared that since McMahon’s policies 
confirmed that Aboriginal people were aliens in their own land they needed an 
embassy to represent them in Canberra like people from other countries do (Foley 
2001, 15).
The tent embassy quickly captured the imagination of the Australian public 
and eventually also the international media (e.g. Trumbull 1972). As days and then 
weeks went by, tents were erected in place of the umbrella and other Aboriginal 
people began to arrive to staff the embassy. The recently designed Aboriginal flag 
was flown, an office tent was established and a letter box was installed, which 
began receiving international mail. In addition to large numbers of tourists, 
visitors to the embassy included Soviet diplomats, a representative from the 
Canadian Indian Claims Commission, an IRA cadre, and opposition leader Gough 
Whitlam (Robinson 1994, 54; Foley 2001, 16). A five-point plan for land rights 
was formalized by the tent ambassadors, which called for Aboriginal control of 
the Northern Territory, legal title and mining rights on all existing reserves and 
settlements, preservation of sacred sites and compensation for alienated land in the 
form of a lump sum payment of six billion dollars and a percentage of the gross 
national product (Newfong 1972).
The tent ambassadors did not initially assert Aboriginal sovereignty. Isobell 
Coe (2000), who participated in the original protest, reflects that:
it took a while for us to understand the difference between land rights and sovereignty. 
Sovereignty means, you know, you own the land, it’s your birthright, and that traditional 
owners have a connection to that country that goes back to the beginning of time.
However, the symbolism of the tent embassy was not lost on the Government. 
Peter Howson, Minister for Environment, Aborigines and the Arts, said that the 
term embassy had a ‘disturbing undertone’ since it ‘implied a sovereign state 
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and cut across the Government’s expressed objection to separate development’ 
(Waterford 1992, C1).
‘No, We will Not Hear that Sort of Thing’ (Gummow J)
‘It is in the nature of a victim’, writes Lyotard (1988, 8), ‘not to be able to prove 
that one has been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages 
and who disposes of the means to prove it. One becomes a victim if one loses these 
means.’ While a plaintiff is the subject of a litigation, a victim is the subject of a 
differend. Both plaintiff and victim have suffered damage. However, the plaintiff 
is able to seek redress for this damage by appealing to a tribunal to arbitrate. 
In litigation one appeals to commonly held norms to represent one’s particular 
experience of suffering as an injustice. In the case of a differend, however, the 
original injury suffered by the victim is accompanied by ‘the impossibility of 
bringing it to the knowledge of others’ (Lyotard 1988, 5).
In settler colonies, such as Australia, indigenous people become the subject 
of a differend by virtue of the fact of internal colonization. While indigenous 
people experience colonisation as invasion, the colonizing society understands its 
occupation of their land as settlement. As James Tully (2000, 39) explains, with 
internal colonization the land, resources and jurisdiction of indigenous people are 
appropriated not only for the sake of exploitation but for the ‘territorial foundation 
of the dominant society itself’. Liberation from external colonization is possible 
by overthrowing the occupying imperial power. However, such a strategy of 
direct confrontation is ineffective in the context of internal colonization in which 
‘the dominant society coexists on and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the 
territories and jurisdictions that the indigenous peoples refuse to surrender’. As 
such, both colonizers and colonized view the system of internal colonisation as a 
temporary means to an end. Indigenous people would resolve this irresolution by 
‘regaining their freedom as self-governing peoples’. In contrast, the settler society 
would resolve the irresolution by the ‘complete disappearance of the indigenous 
problem, that is, the disappearance of indigenous people as free peoples with the 
right to their territories and governments’ (Tully 2000, 40). Tully distinguishes 
between two kinds of strategies by which settler societies typically seek to resolve 
the contradiction of internal colonization: those that seek to extinguish indigenous 
rights (such as the presumption of Crown sovereignty and the doctrine of terra 
nullius) and those that seek to incorporate indigenous people as members of the 
dominant society (assimilation and reconciliation). Strategies of extinguishment 
and strategies of incorporation are both ways in which indigenous people are 
deprived of the means to prove the damages they have incurred. One loses these 
means, writes Lyotard (1998, 8), ‘if the author of the damages turns out precisely 
to be one’s judge’.
In 1979, Paul Coe brought the tent embassy’s nascent political claim to Aboriginal 
sovereignty before the High Court of Australia (Coe v Commonwealth 1979). 
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Among other things, Coe claimed that the proclamations of the representatives of 
the British Crown to sovereignty over the Australian continent were ‘contrary to 
the rights, privileges, interests, claims and entitlements of the aboriginal people’ 
(121). They ‘wrongfully treated the continent now known as Australia as terra 
nullius whereas it was occupied by the sovereign Aboriginal nation’ (122). In the 
leading judgment, Gibbs J found Coe’s claim to be ‘repetitious, confused and 
obscure and in some respects inconsistent with itself’, containing ‘allegations 
and claims that were quite absurd’ (127). The fundamental principle on which 
the claim to sovereignty was rejected was that the annexation of the Australian 
continent took place through ‘acts of state whose validity cannot be challenged’ 
(128). Moreover, given that the Aboriginal people of Australia were not organized 
as a ‘distinct political society separated by others’ the contention that there is a 
sovereign Aboriginal nation, even of a limited kind, was ‘quite impossible in law 
to maintain’. Finally it was stated that it was ‘fundamental to our legal system 
that the Australian colonies became British possessions by settlement and not by 
conquest’ (129). 
In 1992, the Mabo judgment of the High Court was supposed to constitute 
a fundamental break with the colonial past by jettisoning the fiction of terra 
nullius from Australian common law and recognizing native title. As has been 
widely observed, however, continuity remains in the fundamental presumption of 
sovereignty of the Australian state by the court (Wolfe 1994; Motha 2002; 2005). 
The judgment retrospectively recognizes that ‘native title’ was not extinguished 
by the settlement of Australia and continues to exist where it has not been 
extinguished by the establishment of freehold property granted by the state or 
by the ‘tide of history’ (i.e. colonization) through which Aboriginal people have 
lost their traditional connection with the land. Yet it is precisely the legitimacy of 
the Australian state’s claim to jurisdiction that is at stake in the conflict between 
indigenous people and the settler society. Consequently, when brought before 
the formal process of a legal tribunal, the proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty 
becomes an instance of an ‘objection that cannot be heard’ (Christodoulidis 2004). 
Regardless of whether the Australian state seeks the legitimacy of its claim to 
sovereignty in the doctrine of terra nullius or (since 1992) in the retrospective 
recognition of native title, the acquisition of sovereignty is an act of state that 
is not judiciable in a municipal court (Brennan J cited in Motha 2002, 318). As 
Kerruish and Purdy (1998, 152) put it, in legal thought ‘the Australian nation’s 
existence is unquestionable and this unquestionability finds expression in terms 
of sovereignty.’
According to Lyotard the perfect crime would consist:
in obtaining the silence of the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency 
(insanity) of the testimony. You neutralise the addressor, the addressee, and the sense 
of the testimony; then everything is as if there were no referent (no damages). If there 
is nobody to adduce the proof, nobody to admit it, and if the argument that upholds it 
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is judged to be absurd, then the plaintiff is dismissed, the wrong he or she complains of 
cannot be attested. He or she becomes a victim. (Lyotard 1998, 8 – emphasis added)
For Lyotard (1988, 14), every phrase presents a universe that is constituted by an 
addressee (that to which something is signified to be the case), a referent (what it 
is about, the case), a sense (what is signified to be the case) and the addressor (that 
‘through’ which or in the name of which something is signified to be the case). In 
the case of the absurd proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty: the addressee would 
be the invaders; the referent, the ‘fact’ of Aboriginal sovereignty; the sense, that 
sovereignty was unjustly violated by the colonizing society; and the addressor, the 
sovereign Aboriginal people. 
‘In the differend, something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers form the 
wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away’ (Lyotard 1988, 13). The 
positive phrase is replaced by a silence, which constitutes a negative phrase. The 
referent, the addressor, the addressee and the sense are negated (Lyotard 1988, 14). 
Each of these negations is apparent in Gibbs’s judgment:
Negation of the addressee: The situation in question is not the addressee’s business 
(he lacks the competence). ‘The annexation of the east coast of Australia by Captain 
Cook in 1770, and the subsequent acts by which the whole of the Australian continent 
became part of the dominions of the Crown, were acts of state whose validity cannot be 
challenged’ (128) Jacobs J adds: ‘These are not matters of municipal law’ (132).
Negation of the referent: This case does not exist. It never took place. ‘It is quite 
fundamental to our legal system that Australian colonies became British possessions by 
settlement and not by conquest’ (129).
Negation of the sense: This case does cannot be signified. The situation is senseless, 
inexpressible. The claim to Aboriginal sovereignty ‘is quite impossible in law to 
maintain’ (129) Jacobs J adds: These matters ‘are not cognizable in a court exercising 
jurisdiction under that sovereignty which is sought to be challenged’ (132).
Negation of the addressor: This case does not fall within your competence. It is not 
the survivors business to be talking about it. ‘There is no aboriginal nation, if by that 
expression is meant a people organised as a separate state or exercising any degree of 
sovereignty’ (131).
In Tully’s terms, pre-Mabo legal reasoning can be read as a strategy of 
extinguishment. Yet, in his dissenting judgment, Murphy J insisted that ‘the claim 
to rights over land or compensation for loss of such rights is capable of being 
formulated and presented in an intelligible way’ (137). Indeed, the claim to native 
title was found to be intelligible in Australian common law in 1992. However, 
this newly discovered intelligibility did not amount to recognition of the wrong 
of the differend. Rather, it constituted a change in strategy, from extinguishment 
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(although it would enable more of that also) to incorporation, according to which 
the differend would be buried in litigation. 
Law presupposes its own capacity to justly arbitrate conflicting claims within 
society. As such, it recognizes only plaintiffs who can be successful or unsuccessful 
in bringing their claims before its tribunal. A victim cannot be recognized in law 
since law is founded on the presupposition that all claims can be adequately 
represented in terms of public reasoning that is formalized in legal practice. ‘A case 
of the differend between two parties takes place’, however, ‘when the ‘regulation’ 
of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while 
the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom’ (Lyotard 1988, 8). As 
such, the differend is ‘not a matter for litigation’ but rather signals the ‘inability to 
prove’ (Lyotard 1988, 10). One can find oneself in the role of plaintiff and yet be 
a victim. Indeed, the differend is characteristically ‘buried in litigation’ (Lyotard 
1998, 13).
As such, the wrong to which one attempts to testify is treated simply as a 
damage that could be proved or disproved. Either way, one’s testimony to have 
suffered a wrong is found to be false. Lyotard describes this double bind in the 
following way. 
Either:
(a) the damages you complain about never took place and your testimony 
is false, 
or
(b) the damages took place but since you are able to testify to them, it 
is not a wrong that has been done to you but merely a damage and your 
testimony is still false.
Aboriginal people who have brought their land claims before the Australian courts 
in the post-Mabo era have experienced this double bind of the differend first hand. 
Although the Mabo judgment found that native title can continue to exist after 
the establishment of Australian state, the onus remained on indigenous groups to 
bring their claims to native title before the Australian courts in particular cases to 
provide that native title did still exist. In order to be successful, indigenous people 
had to prove that they maintained a traditional association with the land that they 
claimed. This meant that the law afforded redress to those ‘least’ dispossessed 
by colonization. In fact, most native title claims failed, with courts effectively 
establishing that for these groups native title had been extinguished. As Kerruish 
and Purdy (1998, 152) discuss, in making available the legal identity of ‘native 
title claimant/holder’ to indigenous people, Australian property law effectively 
says:
Either
(a) Since you no longer maintain your traditional customs and laws, your 
claim is invalid. Although your ancestors suffered dispossession, you did 
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not. In fact, you are not real Aborigines any more but part of our society.
Or
(b) Since you have maintained your traditional customs and laws you 
have not been dispossessed. In fact, your native title claim has always been 
potentially redeemable within the law.
Whereas a plaintiff who lodges a complaint is heard, the victim is ‘reduced to 
silence’ since there is no phrase available in terms of which the damage suffered 
could be adequately represented. If the victim is heard at all, it is not as a victim 
but as a plaintiff.
In 1998, one of the original tent embassy protestors, Isobell Coe, together with 
several others who persist in viewing the conflict in terms of invasion rather than 
settlement, sought an order from the Supreme Court of the ACT that genocide was 
a recognized crime in Australian law. The application was dismissed. On appeal 
to the Federal Court it was held that the crime of genocide did not form part of the 
common law of Australia. The applicants sought leave to appeal before the High 
Court, which was refused. Isobell Coe was briefly able to address the court: ‘if we 
cannot get justice here in the highest Court of this country, then I think that this 
Court is just a party to the genocide as well’. Gummow J responded: ‘No, we will 
not hear that sort of thing’ (cited in Coe 2000).
Howard’s assertion that the claim to Aboriginal sovereignty is an absurd 
proposition thus appears to be a well-established principle of Australian law. 
Moreover, it seems that, within the terms of the Australian law at least, this clearly 
signals a case of the differend. Within the law courts, the claim to Aboriginal 
sovereignty can only appear as an unreasonable proposal or an illogical assertion. 
The subject of the claim is denied the (legal) means to make the wrong of the 
social order visible. But if the wrong of colonization cannot be redressed legally, 
understanding the absurd proposition of Aboriginal sovereignty as a ridiculous 
presentation suggests how it might nonetheless be possible to redress the wrong 
politically.
‘Action is Against Camping Not Against Demonstration or Protest’ (Ralph 
Hunt)
As with most successful political acts, there was an element of good fortune in the 
staging of the tent embassy outside Parliament House in 1972. A Commonwealth 
ordinance existed which prohibited camping on Crown land without a permit 
but exempted Aborigines. Although the exemption was made with the Northern 
Territory in mind, it also applied to the Australian Capital Territory. As it happened, 
the lawns of Parliament House were Crown land, which effectively meant that the 
Aboriginal activists were entitled to camp there. Over the several weeks following 
Australia day, the tent embassy grew from a single beach umbrella to several tents, 
drawing Aborigines to protest in Canberra from all over the country. Jack Waterford 
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(1992, C1) recalls that it came to ‘look like any number of fairly dirty Aboriginal 
reserves: cooking in the open, bed linen spread about to dry, rather inadequate 
means of keeping clean. It was bringing the reality of Aboriginal Australia right to 
Australia’s front door.’ The Department of Interior was concerned with the impact 
that the protest was having on the lawns surrounding the Parliament, which it 
wanted to be in good condition for the impending visit of the Indonesian President. 
It sought, unsuccessfully, to move the protestors by turning on the sprinklers. 
Concerns were also expressed about the grass getting too long but an arrangement 
was reached whereby the protestors offered to mow the lawn themselves.
For Rancière, in contrast to Lyotard, politics is not the threat of the differend 
but rather comes about with the demonstration of a wrong, which he calls 
disagreement (see Jean-Lois Déotte 2004). To develop this argument, Rancière 
draws an important distinction between politics and police. Police refers to the 
social order that ‘defines a party’s share or lack of it’ (Rancière 1999, 29). It takes 
the population as its object, assigning each part of the population its proper place 
and role. In Rawlsian terms, police concerns the distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of political community. In his Australia day address, McMahon (1972, 
12–13) gave voice to the police when he spoke of assisting Aborigines ‘to hold 
effective and respected places within one Australian society’. Since it is concerned 
with assigning members of society their proper part, the police is inherently 
inegalitarian.
Yet every inegalitarian order implicity presupposes the fundamental equality 
of anyone with everyone. While every social order is based on a division between 
rulers and ruled, for the ruled to be capable of following orders there must be a 
fundamental equality in their capacity as thinking and speaking subjects. This is 
revealed in the double meaning of the verb ‘to understand’. As Rancière explains, 
‘“Do you understand?” is a false interrogative.’ When the colonizers say to the 
colonized, ‘You have no claim to the land we have settled. Do you understand?’ 
they mean: ‘There is nothing for you to understand, you don’t need to understand’ 
and even, possibly, ‘It’s not up to you to understand; all you have to do is obey’ 
(Rancière 1999, 44–5). However, to be capable of obeying an order means that 
one is also capable of understanding its meaning as an order. Since an inegalitarian 
social order depends on the ability of the ruled to obey orders, it necessarily 
presupposes that the ruled have the capacity for political speech that it explicitly 
denies in order to justify their domination (Rancière 1999, 16).
Rather than coming about through the incommensurability of discourses (as 
in Lyotard), for Rancière a wrong refers to this torsion in the social order brought 
about by the radical equality that is necessary to sustain the inequality of social 
relations. The political always involves the presentation of this wrong. Politics is 
the ‘open set of practices driven by the assumption of equality between any and 
every speaking being and by the concern to test this equality’ (Rancière 1999, 30). 
Politics is what brings the contingency of the social order into view by staging a 
meeting of the logic of police with the logic of equality. The polemical space of 
a demonstration ‘holds equality and its absence together’ through the ‘staging of 
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a non-existent right’ (Rancière 1999, 89, 25). As such, politics always entails the 
‘manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one’ (Rancière 2001, 
21). The powerful symbolism of the tent embassy is due to the way in which it 
presents two worlds in one: the social world in which Aborigines are assigned their 
part in the settler society and the political world in which the Aboriginal nation 
addresses the settler society as its equal. The tent embassy invokes Aboriginal 
sovereignty as a right while testifying to the lack of sovereignty in fact. On the one 
hand, the embassy has the symbolic trappings of sovereignty: it flies its own flag 
and it claims the right to negotiate with the Australian state as the representative of 
a sovereign people. On the other hand, the embassy is a tent rather than a permanent 
building. Resembling the fringe dweller camps of rural Australian towns, the tent 
embassy also makes visible the dispossession of indigenous people, their lack of 
sovereignty over their lands.
When Parliament resumed from the summer break on 23 February 1972, after 
several weeks during which support for the demonstrators had grown, the Minister 
for the Interior, Ralph Hunt, announced that the Government would ‘have to look 
at an ordinance to ensure that Parliament Place is reserved for its purpose – a 
place for orderly and peaceful demonstration, but not a place upon which people 
can camp indefinitely’ (House of Reps, Hansard 23/2/72, 108). In late June, Hunt 
announced that the Government intended to enact legislation that would empower 
police to remove the tent embassy. He recommended that ‘the campers’ apply for 
a lease to build an Aboriginal club in the ACT and hoped that ‘they accept this as 
a reasonable proposition’ (cited in Waterford 1992, C2). A document drawn up 
by the Department of the Interior for a Cabinet meeting on 27 June 1972 outlined 
several pros and cons for removing ‘the campers’ should they persist with the 
demonstration. Among the pros were that the ‘proposed action is tactful – directed 
at tents not the individuals’ and that the action is ‘against camping not against 
demonstration or protest’. At the meeting, it was decided to amend the Trespass on 
Commonwealth Lands Ordinance in order empower police to remove the tents.
As Peter Hallward (2006, 117) puts it, the counter-political action of the police 
is first and foremost anti-spectacular. It is less concerned with interpellating 
subjects (as Althusser argues) than with breaking up demonstrations. Rather than 
‘Hey, you there!’, the police is more likely to say ‘Move along! There is nothing 
to see here!’. The police ‘asserts that the space of circulating is nothing other 
than the space of circulation’ (Rancière 2001, 22). This quality of the police is 
vividly described by Roberta Sykes in the extraordinary documentary of the 1972 
protests, Nigla A-Na (‘Hungry for our Land’). On 20 July, within one hour of the 
amended Ordinance being gazetted, 150 police marched toward the tent embassy. 
In a violent confrontation with the protestors, the police removed the tents. Having 
been arrested by police as they forcibly dismantled the tents, Sykes found several 
hours later that she was to be charged with traffic offences so was unable to 
claim that she was a political prisoner. Although empowered to do so, the police 
deliberately avoided charging Aborigines with trespassing on Crown land since 
that would be too politically charged.
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Against the policing of public space, politics consists in ‘transforming this 
space of ‘moving along’ into a space for the appearance of a subject … It consists 
in refiguring this space, of what there is to do there, what is to be seen or named 
therein’ (Rancière 2001, 22). On Sunday 23 July 1972 two hundred Aboriginal 
people and their supporters marched to Parliament House to restore the tent 
embassy. Once erected, they defiantly encircled the tents to protect them. The 
demonstrators met the intimidation of state violence with ridicule. When it was 
rumoured that Minister Ralph Hunt was watching the proceedings from a window 
of Parliament House, ‘a chant started up, rhyming slang mocking the minister’s 
surname’ (Robinson 1994, 57–8). This time the demonstrators were met by 360 
police who marched in formation, appearing from behind Parliament House. The 
demonstrators began to chant ‘Sieg Heil’. The tents were again removed in an 
even more violent confrontation. The demonstrators were dispersed, but vowed 
to return the following Sunday. On 30 July, around two thousand Aboriginal 
protestors and their supporters and one thousand tourists and onlookers returned 
to Parliament House and a tent was re-erected.  Clearly outnumbered, on this 
occasion the police did not intervene. After several hours, two unarmed police 
were allowed into the crowd to remove the tent. A few moments later the police 
observed another embassy apparently being erected on the other side of the park. 
They ran over to tear it down, only to discover it was ‘just a whole lot of people 
standing up holding a piece of canvas on their heads’ (Sykes in Robinson 1994, 
61). The police removed the canvas ‘to reveal a circle of Aboriginal people sitting 
smiling at them, making the then-popular raised V-sign of peace and holding aloft 
a placard designating the site as the Aboriginal Embassy’ (Robinson 1994, 62).
Politics, Rancière insists, is:
primarily conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the existence and 
status of those present on it. It must first be established that the stage exists for the 
use of the interlocutor who can’t see it and who can’t see it for good reason because it 
doesn’t exist. Parties do not exist prior to the conflict they name and in which they are 
not counted as parties. (Rancière 1999, 27)
The tent embassy can be understood as an attempt to establish such a common stage. 
At first glance, such an interpretation is at odds with the spirit of the Aboriginal 
tent embassy and the ethos of Black Power that animated it. Aboriginal people 
might rightly insist that they do not owe their identity to the settler society and that 
it was their identity as traditional owners of the land that they were asserting or 
reclaiming. And yet, there is an important sense in which the sovereign Aboriginal 
nation in whose name the tent ambassadors planted their beach umbrella did 
‘not exist prior to the declaration of wrong’ (Rancière 1999, 39). In doing so, the 
tent embassy demonstrators sought to speak from a subject position that was not 
afforded to them by the social order.
In Parliament, Hunt suggested that ‘the protagonists for Aborigines are 
frequently neither Aboriginal nor part-Aboriginal’, claiming that ‘the Communist 
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controlled unionists, the so-called peace movements, Maoists, Trotskyites and 
left-wingers generally are hell-bent on dividing the Australian nation on racist 
issues’ (Hansard 23/2/72, 133, 129). Throughout the time the embassy was 
encamped outside Parliament House in 1972, Howson, the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, had refused to negotiate with the ‘unrepresentative militants’ (Robinson 
1994, 59). In August, he instead convened a national conference of Government-
selected delegates, which he claimed was truly representative of all Aborigines. 
However, the conference voted to give the tent embassy representatives full 
speaking and voting rights and passed a motion calling for the tent embassy to be 
re-established.
There is a striking parallel here between the story of the tent embassy and that 
which Rancière recounts about the secession of the Roman plebeians on Aventine 
Hill. According to Rancière (1999, 23), in Ballanche’s retelling of Livy’s account, 
the ‘entire issue at stake involves finding out whether there exists a common stage 
where plebeians and patricians can debate anything’. For the intransigent patricians, 
there can be no negotiating with the plebs for the simple reason that they are 
deprived of the logos. They have only voice, in which they can express pleasure 
or pain but lack speech, the fundamental political capacity according to which a 
distinction can be known between the harmful and useful, the just and unjust. In 
response, the plebeians constitute themselves as another political community and 
send an emissary to negotiate with the patricians. When one of the patricians, 
Menenius, comes to deliver an apologia to the plebeians – a justification of the 
social order and the necessary inequality between patricians and plebeians – they 
‘listen politely and thank him but only so they can ask him for a treaty’ (Rancière 
1999, 25). In the Roman senate, a secret council of wise men conclude that ‘since 
the plebs have become creatures of speech there is nothing left to do but to talk to 
them’ (Rancière 1999, 24–5).
Contrary to Lyotard, Ranciére insists that although a wrong cannot be regulated 
it can be processed. This processing of a wrong occurs ‘through the mechanisms 
of subjectification that give it substance as an alterable relationship between 
the parties, indeed as a shift in the playing field’ (Ranciére 1999, 30). The tent 
embassy was extraordinarily successful as a symbolic enactment of Aboriginal 
sovereignty. As such it opened the possibility of such a shift in the playing field 
in settler–indigenous relations. However, Australian Aborigines have not been 
successful in their demand for a treaty. Indeed, it is no small irony that the formal 
reconciliation process ended in 2001 with a call for a treaty between indigenous 
people and the state. In 2008, the newly elected Australian Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd gave a long awaited formal apology to Aboriginal people. While indigenous 
people generally regarded the apology to be appropriate, for most the issue of 
a treaty remains the ‘unfinished business’ of reconciliation. In this context, the 
tent embassy, and the shift in the playing field that it sought to bring about, 
perhaps provides an indigenous exemplar for conceptualizing reconciliation as 
decolonisation. For, although feared by conservatives as a demand for separation, 
in staging a disagreement the tent embassy also intimated a proto-political 
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community in which colonizers and colonized might address each other as equals. 
As such the enactment of Aboriginal sovereignty by the tent ambassadors might be 
understood to invoke the community-to-be-reconciled even as it makes manifest 
the wrong of colonization that divides indigenous and settler societies. The tent 
embassy thus remains a powerful exemplar of the possibility of processing the 
wrong of colonization in Australia today.
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